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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly for many Americans, broadband Internet access is
a fundamental aspect to remain interconnected and participate in
everyday life.1 Many citizens have shifted their own communication and mediated environments and practices to an online world to
engage socially, economically, politically, and culturally. There are
1

See, e.g., John Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America (FCC Omnibus
Broadband Initiative, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1, Feb. 2010), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/broadband-adoption-in-americapaper.pdf; Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-inthe-u-s/; Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, Digital Life in 2025, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/digital-life-in-2025/; THOM
FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2013, (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf.

2015]

NEUTRALITY 2.0

641

also a growing number of individuals who depend heavily on highspeed Internet service anywhere, anytime, whether through a tablet, desktop computer, SmartTV, video game console, or streaming
media player via a local area network, Wi-Fi hotspot, 4G wireless,
DSL, cable modem, or fiber-to-the-home. Arguably, one may suggest that the mass media landscape and its related industry structures, revenue, and distribution models are in a period of tremendous flux because of the Internet’s end-to-end design and ability to
foster competition, innovation through digital distribution of overthe-top content, and services that typically retain or improve the
quality of existing offerings at a fraction of the price.
While this outpouring of change allows for an expansion of
voices in the marketplace, including user-generated content and
social media, such a shift is predicated on viable high-speed Internet access being not only available to as many citizens as possible,
but also first and last mile providers who provide quality connections without egregious network management practices that may
block or drop specific services or content or even discriminate by
favoring specific popular Internet sites over others with exclusive
rates for higher speeds of service.
Although there have been very few blatant network management abuses reported, imagine for an instant Comcast or any other
cable operator’s dilemma with competing video content through
edge providers like Netflix or Hulu that detract viewers from traditional television viewing and advertising. Comcast has relied heavily throughout the years upon revenue from subscribers paying for
cable television services and increased its physical distribution plan
with fiber to further increase channel capacity to compete with direct broadcast satellite, offer more robust Internet connections, and
enter the local telephone business.
But today, that bundle of services is facing stiff competition as
consumers cut the cord and drop their landline service and multichannel video program distributor (“MVPD”) subscriptions. To
help abate some of these concerns and compete with emergent
over-the-top video services and new facilities-based entrants like
Verizon’s FIOS, Comcast rebranded its cable TV service and
launched XFINITY TV to provide both on-demand set-top box
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and online content.2 Arguably, it is not in Comcast’s best interests
to cannibalize its current video subscription revenues and simply
watch its broadband subscribers migrate to over-the-top services
for competing video content.
As this past year’s debate has highlighted, there is a fear that
fixed and mobile broadband Internet access providers may begin to
peel back on their practices of openness at any given time without
strong network neutrality provisions such as those recently put into
place and those overturned in the past. A provider like Comcast is
both horizontally and vertically integrated in the types of services
and content it owns3 and may in effect use the first- and last-mile
broadband leverage to help retain and even grow revenue flows.4
After all, in most markets, there are typically two facilities-based
competitors for fixed broadband Internet access, especially when
seeking a 25 Mbps connection.5 As a result, a broadband duopoly
scenario leaves a tremendous amount of power and discretion with
the two Internet access providers in how they manage their network. Perhaps even more profound is the occurrence of a company
like Verizon that provides its own MVPD service as well as fixed
and mobile high-speed Internet. While there are four large wireless
broadband providers in the country that provide cellphone service,
there is only one facilities-based provider, Verizon, that provides
consumers with the potential bundle of both fixed and wireless
broadband Internet access and MVPD service.

2

Todd Spangler, Comcast Counts to ‘Xfinity’, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Dec. 21, 2009),
http://www.multichannel.com/news/cable-operators/comcast-counts-xfinity/329060. A
couple of months after rebranding TV, Comcast decided to use the name for its entire
product line and platforms. See Mike Farrell, Comcast Rebrand: to Xfinity and Beyond,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.multichannel.com/news/marketing/
comcast-rebrand-xfinity-and-beyond/291590.
3
Brad Bannon, The Big, Bad Comcast Merger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 27,
2014, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/brad-bannon/2014/08/27/the-comcasttime-warner-merger-is-bad-for-everybody.
4
Grant Gross, Comcast deal gives it market power on Internet backbone, critic says, PC
WORLD (May 8, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2153000/comcast-deal-gives-itmarket-power-on-internet-backbone-critic-says.html.
5
Brian Fung, FCC Chairman: ‘A Duopoly’ Dominates Basic Internet Service in America,
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2014/09/04/fcc-chairman-a-duopoly-dominates-basic-internet-service-in-america/.
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To help clarify these issues, in 2010 the Federal Communications Commission established the “Open Internet Rules” for
broadband providers, calling for three network-management principles centered on antiblocking, non-discrimination, and transparency requirements.6 Recently, in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the antiblocking and non-discriminatory
provisions but left the transparency requirements intact for both
fixed and wireless broadband providers.7 Likewise, the FCC recently issued its 2015 Open Internet order that reiterated and enhanced the previously upheld transparency rules.8
Moving forward, transparency requirements are therefore a
central focus within the FCC’s approach to foster an open Internet
and appear integral to the future broadband ecosystem. Even
though broadband providers publish and distribute terms of service
conditions to obtain user consent and avoid legal liability, only recently have they been required by law to disclose how they manage
the network and report important consumer quality-of-service information like speed and latency. Through legal research and analysis, this Article reviews the shift toward transparency and disclosure as part of the solution to the network neutrality debate by asking the following research question: How do the FCC’s suggested
transparency requirements, as set forth thus far in the Open Internet Rules, apply to broadband Internet access providers?
Part I of this Article discusses the regulation and judicial review
behind the network neutrality debate. Part II reviews the FCC’s
transition to transparency as detailed in the Open Internet Rules,
focusing specifically on what fixed and mobile broadband providers
may disclose to comply with the provisions and avoid potential
sanctions. To further help illustrate how the transparency rules apply, Part III examines Verizon’s terms of service conditions to
measure to how its fixed and mobile broadband Internet access services comply with the FCC’s suggested disclosure practices. Lastly, Part IV provides an appraisal of the FCC’s transparency ef6

See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, ¶ 1 (2010).
See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
8
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14–28, Report and
Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling and Order ¶ 24 (Mar. 12, 2015), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/openinternet [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order].
7
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forts—which have thus far withstood legal challenge—as a solution
in network neutrality policy and offers suggestions regarding further disclosure of meaningful information to consumers.
I.

REGULATION & JUDICIAL REVIEW INVOLVING
NETWORK NEUTRALITY
Network neutrality is an ongoing debate concerning the degree
to which Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) may exercise control
over their own network, including their ability to route traffic efficiently and charge different prices for faster service.9 With its roots
in broadband open-access policy10 and the Computer Inquiries,11
the issue stemmed from fears a post-Brand X environment where
ISPs who are deemed to provide “information services” are largely
left unregulated even though their core product involves a “telecommunications component,”12 one which would by past regulatory standards seemingly invoke some type of common-carrier burden that would otherwise ensure that providers would not discriminate among similarly situated users or content.
A primary reason that the debate exists is that Congress has
largely left this question unanswered within the Communications
Act of 1934,13 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of
9

There is a great deal of scholarship addressing network neutrality. See, e.g., Jan
Krämer et al., Net Neutrality: A Progress Report, 37 TELECOMM. POL’Y 794–813 (2013);
Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141–75 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 2–77 (2005); Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu
and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575–92 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network
Neutrality or Bias-Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2006).
10
For legal analysis of the open access debate, see Justin Brown, Fostering the Public’s
End-to-End: A Policy Initiative for Separating Broadband Transport from Content, 8 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 146–99 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable
Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2000); Harold Feld, Whose Line is It Anyway—The First
Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23 (2000); James B. Speta,
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 40–91 (2000).
11
For legal analysis on the Computer Inquiries, see Robert M. Frieden, The Third
Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 383–410 (1987).
12
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984–
85 (2005).
13
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
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1996.14 Even though the Telecommunications Act of 1996 leveled
the playing field between phone and cable operators offering one
another’s services, it did little in answering how ISPs should be
classified and regulated, especially in a broadband environment
that features digital subscriber lines, cable modems, and more recently, fiber to the curb or home as well as mobile, including 4G
LTE services. Furthermore, as broadband speeds and utility rise,
concerns mount over how so-called edge and over-the-top
(“OTT”) providers like Netflix, Hulu, YouTube and Pandora may
be treated.15 With the exception of YouTube via Google, these providers do not own the first and last mile access to the Internet, ostensibly relying upon broadband ISPs to carry their traffic to reach
their customers.16
A. The FCC’s Network Management Principles
As a result of initial fears of what may happen in an unregulated
information services environment, the FCC crafted an Internet
Policy Statement in 2005 that called for “neutral” behavior among
ISPs.17 Specifically, the FCC adopted four principles, asserting that
consumers are entitled: (1) “to access the lawful Internet content
of their choice”; (2) “to run applications and use services of their
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement”; (3) “to connect
their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network”; and (4)
“to competition among network providers, application and service
providers, and content providers.”18
The Commission justified these provisions as within its powers
of ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act
and necessary to help promote broadband deployment and advanced telecommunications capability as specified in Section 706.19
14

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
Michael Sorrentino, Top Internet Companies Push for Net Neutrality Ahead of FCC
Comment Deadline, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 14, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/politics/internet-brands-push-net-neutrality-fcc-deadline-article-1.1866402.
16
Nilay Patel, Over the Top: The New War For TV is Just Beginning, THE VERGE (Nov.
12, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/12/3633984/future-of-tv-over-the-top.
17
See Policy Statement, Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,986 (2005).
18
Id. at 14,988.
19
See id. at 14,987.
15
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Moreover, the provisions help instill and encourage an open, vibrant, competitive, and interconnected Internet that is grounded in
Section 230(b).20 The FCC made clear that these principles are
“subject to reasonable network management” practices and did
not constitute official rules.21
B. Comcast v. FCC
In 2007, the Associated Press alleged Comcast was blocking
peer-to-peer (“P2P”) applications on its network.22 Specifically,
Comcast was interfering with users trying to upload and share
Gnutella and BitTorrent files.23 Free Press filed a complaint against
Comcast24 and a petition with the FCC25 requesting that the
Commission declare that such application degradation and blocking fall outside of acceptable network management practices as set
forth in the Internet Policy Statement.
Upon receiving public comment on the petition and conducting
its own investigation, the FCC found that Comcast did degrade
P2P applications and had in effect prevented consumers from accessing lawful applications of their choice, thus violating the Internet Policy Statement.26 One primary reason the FCC found fault
with Comcast’s approach was that it failed to fully disclose its network management practices.27 Because Comcast had already
agreed to stop its specific management methods relevant to P2P
applications, the FCC issued neither a fine nor a cease and desist
order. Rather, the FCC required Comcast to become more transparent by clearly establishing and publicly disclosing its network
management practices and developing a plan to incorporate non20

See id.
See id. at 14,988 n.15.
22
Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19,
2007, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21376597/#.U3BRYPldWa8.
23
Id. These programs are typically used to exchange music and video files, often to
avoid paying for copyrighted works. At the time of the findings in 2007, it was estimated
that P2P applications accounted for 50 to 90 percent of overall Internet traffic. Id.
24
Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation
For Secretly Disregarding Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028 (2008).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
21
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discriminatory network methods within thirty days.28 After Comcast complied and filed its network management practices, the
Commission took issue with how Comcast treats its own and competitors’ Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) phone services,
including why these voice services should not be treated as telecommunications services within Title II of the Communications
Act.29
Even though Comcast abated the questionable network management practices involving P2P applications and argued that its
VoIP services fall outside the scope of telecommunications services, it nevertheless appealed the FCC’s decision to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.30 Upon review, the court ruled the FCC
failed to establish how its ancillary jurisdiction was connected to a
clear statutory provision and vacated the FCC’s Comcast order.31
By applying the American Library Association v. FCC32 test for
ancillary jurisdiction, the court examined whether Title I applies to
network practices among Cable ISPs as well as whether these regulations are “reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”33 While
finding Title I general jurisdiction applied, the court nevertheless
found the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement did not amount to
“statutorily mandated responsibilities” set forth in the Communications Act.34 In fact, the court articulated that mere reliance on
policy statements found in the Communications Act to justify regulation would provide too much latitude beyond powers delegated
by Congress.35
Because the FCC failed to establish its authority, the court did
not visit whether it acted appropriately in determining Comcast’s
P2P network management practices had violated its Internet Policy
28

Id.
See Matthew Lasar, FCC wants to know if Comcast is interfering with VoIP,
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2009, 11:25 PM), http://www.arstechnica.com/business/
2009/01/fcc-wants-to-know-if-comcast-is-interfering-with-voip/.
30
Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
31
Id. at 661.
32
406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
33
Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646–47.
34
Id. at 652.
35
See id. at 661.
29

648

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:639

Statement. Some scholars have suggested that, because the Commission did not seek public comments, the Internet Policy Statement would be unenforceable under the Administrative Procedures
Act.36 Nevertheless, the court suggested that Section 706 of the
Communications Act may grant the FCC reasonable ancillary jurisdiction to cover cable Internet services network management
practices, in effect leaving the door open for future regulatory attempts.37
C. The FCC’s Open Internet Order
While written with the goal of remedying the ancillary jurisdiction question at issue in Comcast, the FCC’s Open Internet Rules
establish several network neutrality provisions concerning transparency, no blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination practices
for both fixed and wireless broadband Internet access providers:38
Transparency: All broadband providers “shall publicly disclose
accurate information regarding network management practices,
performance and commercial terms of [their] broadband Internet
access services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices
regarding the use of such service and for content, application, service and device providers to develop, market and maintain their
Internet offerings.”39
No Blocking: Fixed broadband providers “shall not block lawful
content, applications, services or non-harmful devices, subject to
reasonable network management.”40 Mobile broadband providers
“shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites . . . nor
block applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video
telephony services, subject to reasonable network management.”41
No Unreasonable Discrimination: All broadband providers
“shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful net-

36
37
38
39
40
41

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2000).
See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658–59.
Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,906 (2010).
Id. at 17,992, ¶ 8.3.
Id. at ¶ 8.5.
Id.
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work traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access service.”42
The FCC defines a network management practice as reasonable
“if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network
management purpose”43 factoring in both network technology and
architecture. The Commission also claims that “transparency and
end-user control are touchstones of reasonableness.”44
The FCC believes it possesses proper regulatory and ancillary
jurisdiction powers under the broad mandate of Section 706 because the Open Internet Rules promote the deployment of “advanced telecommunications capability,” including Internet access,
and further promote local competition and infrastructure investment.45 Under this section, the FCC generates annual reports on
the availability of advanced telecommunications capability and may
take swift action if needed to accelerate its development.46 In addition, the Commission contends the rules may also be supported
through ancillary jurisdiction under Title II,47 Title III,48 and Title
VI,49 and that the transparency provision may be supported by the
need to supply annual reports to Congress50 and “obtain ‘full and
complete information’ from common carriers and their affiliates.”51
Furthermore, the FCC refuted claims that the transparency, no
blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination practices violated
either the First or Fifth Amendment.52 The Commission claims
broadband providers’ First Amendment speaker rights are not violated because the rules themselves do not target specific messages
or viewpoints and are therefore content-neutral under intermediate

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 17,992, 17,993, § 8.7.
Id. at 17,993, § 8.11.
Id. at 17,908, ¶ 6.
Id. at 17,971, ¶ 122.
Id. at 17,972, ¶ 123.
Id. at 17,972–74, ¶¶ 125–26.
Id. at 17,975, 17,978–80, ¶ 128, 133–35.
Id. at 17,975–79, ¶¶ 129–32.
Id. at 17,980–81, ¶ 136.
Id. at 17,981, ¶ 137 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 218 (2012)).
See id. at 17,982–86.
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scrutiny.53 The Open Internet Rules simply address the transmission service provided by broadband Internet access providers and,
as a result, these carriers should be viewed merely as conduits for
speech.54 The Fifth Amendment is not at issue because the Open
Internet Rules do not amount to a taking of property but simply
require broadband Internet access providers to be transparent and
refrain from blocking or unreasonable discrimination when the
“voluntarily” carry traffic.55
D. Verizon v. FCC
The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the antidiscrimination and anti-blocking rules but upheld the transparency
requirements.56 The court found difficulty in the fact that the FCC
had reversed its own course in favoring rules that called for common-carrier provisions because these were in opposition to the information services classification agreed upon by the Commission in
previous rulemaking and subsequent litigation.57 According to the
court, this existing regulatory action negated the possibility of
common-carrier provisions like the anti-blocking and antidiscrimination rules because the FCC failed to find broadband service providers as telecommunication service providers.58 The
Communications Act has not been amended to clearly define
broadband providers and delegate a particular regulatory classification. Accordingly, broadband providers remain information service
providers, free from Title II’s common-carrier requirements and
may even engage in blocking or discrimination.
In Verizon, the court even addressed how broadband ISPs have
to treat edge providers under the no-blocking and discrimination
53

Id. at 17,983–85, ¶¶ 145–46. The rules serve an important governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of free expression and do not burden more speech than
necessary. The governmental interests include “preserving an open Internet to encourage
competition and remove impediments to infrastructure investment while enabling
consumer choice, end-user control, free expression and the freedom to innovate without
permission . . . ensure the public’s access to a multiplicity of information sources and
maximize the Internet’s potential to serve the public’s interest.” Id. at 17,984, ¶ 146.
54
Id. at 17,982–84, ¶¶ 141, 145.
55
Id. at 17,985, ¶ 149.
56
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
57
Id. at 624.
58
Id. at 644–53.
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provisions of the Open Internet Rules.59 Using the analogy of Midwest Video II, the court suggested that the rules force broadband
providers to in effect be common carriers of content because they
must “serve all edge providers without unreasonable discrimination” and “hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminately.”60 With the local access channel regulations at issue in FCC v.
Midwest Video II,61 third parties providing programming may have
forced carriage of their content and displaced the cable operator’s
editorial discretion and control.62 The Supreme Court found that
these local access requirements made cable operators de facto
common carriers.63 Likewise, according to the D.C. Circuit, prior
to the Open Internet Rules, broadband providers were able to refuse to carry edge provider content by blocking or discriminating if
they had exercised such an option, but the anti-blocking and antidiscriminatory provisions in effect take away these rights64 and
compel carriage to all edge providers in all circumstances.65
In upholding the transparency provisions, the court suggested
that the disclosure rules do not amount to common carrier obligations.66 Even though Verizon contended that the disclosure rules
should fail if the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules were
vacated, the court agreed with the FCC that the rules function separately and would have been adopted on their own.67 Accordingly,
this decision breathed life into the FCC’s efforts to provide consumers with more information about their Internet experience.
E. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet NPRM
To respond to the jurisdictional and common carriage questions raised in Verizon v. FCC, the Commission drafted new proposed rules in May 2014 in its effort to further clarify and modify

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 656.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 654–56.
Id.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 653–54.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 659.
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its network neutrality policy in the Open Internet Order.68 The
Commission suggested that the Verizon decision did not dismiss
the ability to regulate broadband Internet service under Section
706.69 Though the rules were unofficial, for both fixed and mobile
broadband the FCC proposed to enhance the transparency rules,
retain the no-blocking provisions under a revised rationale, and
change the non-discrimination measure to no commercially unreasonable practices.70
The FCC reverts back to the exact language for the different
no-blocking provisions that apply to fixed and mobile broadband as
set forth in its Open Internet Order. In keeping these no-blocking
rules, the Commission clarified that broadband providers may negotiate “individualized, differentiated arrangements with similarlysituated edge providers” as long as they are commercially reasonable71 and “do not degrade lawful content or service to below a minimum level of access.”72 The Commission states that the noblocking rule establishes a minimum service as a threshold that all
broadband providers must meet, and such a result will “ensure that
all users have access to an Internet experience that is sufficiently
robust, fast and effectively usable,”73 including all end users and
edge providers, even those who don’t enter into separate negotiated agreements for faster service.
In modifying the non-discriminatory rules to no commercially
unreasonable practices, the FCC suggests broadband providers engage in commercially reasonable activities and prohibit unreasonable “practices that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
threaten to harm Internet openness and all that it protects.”74 As
long as the conduct is commercially reasonable, such a rule allows
broadband providers to reach individual terms and agreements to
carry traffic with different end users and edge providers without
having these same conditions apply to all customers indiscriminate68

Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (July 1, 2014) (to
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
69
Id. at 37,455, ¶ 55.
70
See id. at 37,449, ¶ 10.
71
Id. at 37,460, ¶ 89.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 37,461, ¶ 98.
74
Id. at 37,464, ¶ 116.
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ly.75 The Commission “tentatively conclude[s]” that this rule
should be distinct from the no-blocking rule, thereby allowing separate review of these standards if questionable blocking or commercially unreasonable practices occur.76 The FCC also clarifies that
reasonable network management shall not constitute a commercially unreasonable practice.77
Collectively, the new proposed rules would allow broadband
providers to establish what is commonly referred to as “paid prioritization” or “pay for priority” for edge providers who supply popular over-the-top content, including online video distributors like
Netflix, Hulu, Amazon, and YouTube.78 With the exception of
Google in some markets, nearly all edge providers and end users do
not own the first- and last-mile fixed or mobile broadband network
connection that supplies the public with Internet access. With the
new FCC suggestions, in effect these edge providers as well as
high-traffic social media sites like Facebook and Twitter may negotiate individual arrangements to attain a guaranteed quality and
higher speed of service with broadband Internet access providers as
long as the arrangements don’t amount to blocking or result in an
unreasonable commercial practice.79 Such paid-peering deals have
already taken place prior to the proposed rules,80 suggesting this
trend may result in “toll booths” for Internet content and potentially erode the ability for smaller edge users, startups, or end users
with compelling content or services to reach the public because
they won’t be able to pay for faster, higher-quality Internet ac-
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Id. at 37,464, ¶ 116.
See id. ¶ 117.
77
See id.
78
Brooks Boliek & Jessica Meyers, FCC Vote: Net Neutrality with a ‘Fast Lane’,
POLITICO (May 15, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/fcc-approve-netneutrality-proposal-open-internet-106720.html.
79
See Edward Wyatt, F.C.C., in a Shift, Backs Fast Lanes for Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/technology/fcc-new-net-neut
rality-rules.html?_r=0; Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Backs Opening Net Neutrality Rules for
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/16/technology/
fcc-road-map-to-net-neutrality.html.
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Sam Gustin, Netflix Pays Verizon in Streaming Deal, Following Comcast Pact, TIME
(Apr. 28, 2014), http://time.com/80192/netflix-verizon-paid-peering-agreement/.
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cess.81 Instead, smaller edge providers and most end users will have
to rely upon the notion under the no-blocking rules that there will
be a minimum threshold of service and speed quality for all broadband Internet access providers. In contrast, some commentators
believe the paid prioritization trend is an inevitable part of the
growth and commercialization of the Internet.
The FCC also suggests strengthening the existing transparency
requirements that are in effect for broadband providers. The
Commission believes “access to accurate information about broadband provider practices encourages the competition, innovation
and high-quality services that drive consumer demand and broadband investment and deployment.”82 Although it previously stated
that a single disclosure may suffice, the FCC tentatively concludes
that three tailored disclosures would be best to meet the different
interests and needs of end users, edge providers, and the broader
Internet community.83 For instance, end users require accurate information to make educated purchasing and broadband usage decisions, whereas edge providers may benefit from more technical data and information that may spur the creation of broadband apps
and services. Meanwhile, the Internet community at large, including the FCC, is concerned with monitoring reasonable network
practices that may impact the openness of the Internet.84
Beyond tailoring the disclosures to three different audiences,
the FCC suggests requiring broadband Internet access providers to
make more information publicly available concerning network practices. First, the FCC proposes the transparency rules should also
require broadband Internet access providers to disclose “meaningful information regarding source timing speed packet loss and dura-
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See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, Opinion, No Tolls on The
Internet, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/06/07/AR2006060702108.html; Nikke Finke, Comcast Accused of ‘Putting
up Toll Booth’ and ‘Take it or Leave it Demands’ for Online Movie Transmission by Rivals,
DEADLINE (Nov. 29, 2010), http://deadline.com/2010/11/comcast-accused-of-puttingup-a-toll-booth-for-online-movie-transmission-by-rivals-87142/.
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Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448-01, ¶ 66 (July 1,
2014) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
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Id. at 37,457, ¶ 68.
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tion of congestion.”85 In addition, disclosure should happen in a
timely fashion to parties whenever broadband providers “make
changes to network practices as well as blocking, throttling and pay
for priority arrangements or parameters of default or ‘best effort’
service as distinct from any priority service.”86
The FCC also requested comments on a range of issues related
to its proposed refinements to the network neutrality rules, including proper regulatory authority under Section 706 or Title II, Title
III (mobile), the new rule, definition and impact of “no commercially unreasonable practices,” how edge provider carriage of traffic should be defined and whether it should be classified as a separate service,87 and further details concerning the enhancement of
the transparency provisions. In addition, the proposed rules added
definitions involving what constitutes block,88 edge provider,89 and
end users90 but left the terms of what constitutes fixed, mobile, and
broadband Internet access services as well as reasonable network
management unchanged.
F. 2015 Open Internet Order
To help validate its justification and approach to an open Internet and instill network neutrality provisions,91 the FCC reclassified
broadband Internet access service92 as a telecommunications ser85

Id.; see also id. at 37,479–83 (discussing the proposed rules).
Id. at 37,458, ¶ 78.
87
Id. at 37,455, ¶ 55.
88
Id. at 37,480, § 8.11(a) (“The failure of a broadband Internet access service to
provide an edge provider with a minimum level of access that is sufficiently robust, fast,
and dynamic for effective use by end users and edge providers.”).
89
Id. § 8.11(c) (“Any individual or entity that provides any content, application, or
service over the Internet, and any individual or entity that provides a device for accessing
any content, application, or service over the Internet.”).
90
Id. at 37,480, § 8.11(d) (defining “end users” as “[a]ny individual or entity that uses
a broadband Internet access service”).
91
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1–4.
92
Broadband Internet access service is
a mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the
capability to transmit data to and receive data from all of substantially
all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to
and enable the operation of the communications service, but
excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses
any service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional
86
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vice, applying common carrier, Title II classification to both fixed
and wireless providers.93 This particular determination represents
a significant shift from previous regulatory classifications that
treated broadband Internet access service as an “information service.”94 Even though the FCC adopted the telecommunications
service classification, its approach is nevertheless “common carrier
light” as evidenced by its exercise of forbearance authority for
twenty seven different Title II provisions,95 including no tariffing
(rate regulation).96 The Commission also utilized advanced telecommunications capability under Section 706 to help bolster its
common carrier-light approach97 as well as Title III regulatory jurisdiction to buttress its telecommunications service classification
of wireless Internet access service.98
Within these foundations, the FCC issued several main network neutrality provisions, retaining the no-blocking provisions on
“lawful content applications, services or non-harm devices,”99 and
prohibiting the practice of “throttling,”100 subject to “reasonable
network management.”101 To abate concerns raised by edge providers that some traffic may receive special high-speed lanes,102 the

equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is
used to evade the protections set forth in this part.
Id. ¶ 25.
93
Id. ¶¶ 27, 283–84.
94
Id. ¶ 43 (“The facts in the market today are very different from the facts that
supported the Commission’s 2002 decision to treat cable broadband service as an
information service and its subsequent application to fixed and mobile broadband
services.”).
95
Id. ¶¶ 5, 493.
96
Id. ¶¶ 41–42, 497–505.
97
Id. ¶¶ 275–82.
98
Id. ¶¶ 285–88.
99
Id. ¶ 15.
100
Id. ¶ 16 (Throttling is defined as “impair of degrade lawful Internet traffic on the
basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device.”).
101
Id. ¶¶ 32,215 (“A network management practice is a practice that has a primarily
technical network management justification, but does not include other business
practices. A network management practice is reasonable if it is primarily used for and
tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the
particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access
service.”).
102
Id. ¶¶ 20, 80.
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FCC also barred the practice of “paid prioritization.”103 Instead of
restricting commercially unreasonable practices, the FCC created a
new rule that prohibits ISPs from unreasonably interfering with or
disadvantaging consumers’ ability “to reach Internet content, services and applications of their choosing”104 as well as edge providers’ access to Internet consumers.105 These provisions will be applied to make determinations on whether to allow so-called sponsored data plans by ISPs106 and data caps that meter and tier the
amount of downloading.107
In addition to outlawing blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization, the FCC also further enhanced its existing transparency
provisions contained in the Open Internet Rules for end users and
edge providers.108 Broadband providers are now required to disclose promotional rates, all fees and/or surcharges and include specific information on all data caps or allowances in their terms of
service.109 In addition, to help end users be better informed, broadband providers must include packet loss as a measure of network
performance.110 Customers must also be notified when a network
practice may be likely to significantly impact their use of broadband
Internet access.111 With respect to the format and nature of required disclosure to consumers, the FCC declined to require separate disclosures for end users and edge providers112 but established
a “safe harbor” process for broadband providers to help aid in the
effective presentation of required information.113

103

Id. ¶ 18 (“‘Paid prioritization’ refers to the management of a broadband provider’s
network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic, including through
the use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, resource reservation, or other
forms of preferential traffic management, either (a) in exchange for consideration
(monetary or otherwise) from a third party or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.”).
104
Id. ¶ 135.
105
Id.
106
Id. ¶¶ 151, 152.
107
Id. ¶ 153.
108
Id. ¶ 24.
109
Id. ¶¶ 24, 161.
110
Id. ¶¶ 24, 166.
111
Id. ¶¶ 24, 169.
112
Id. ¶ 177.
113
Id. ¶¶ 24, 179–81.
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II. TRANSPARENCY AS NETWORK NEUTRALITY POLICY
Systems of law, policy, and government are based on the availability of information.114 One may simply not understand, debate,
maintain, or enforce the law—regardless of whether it is statutory,
common, constitutional, or executive—if the public does not have
the ability to access it, know what conduct or actions are acceptable, or know what sanctions may be rendered. But beyond understanding the law and its sanctions, transparency is typically conceptualized as information that the public, including the press and its
tools under the fourth estate, may access to effectively monitor
government in a democracy and hold it accountable.115 Within
states and federally, “sunshine” and freedom-of-information laws
and processes exist to make as many meetings and information
open as possible.116 Regulatory agencies like the FCC have to follow these provisions and also publicly announce steps involved
within the rulemaking process within the Administrative Procedure
Act, including initial and reply comments to foster disclosure and
fairness when enacting official rule changes.117 The White House
and President Obama’s Memorandum on Transparency and Open
Government, part of its Open Government Directive, suggests that
“openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency
and effectiveness in Government,”118 asserting that transparency
can also lead to greater civic participation and better policy decisions.119
But an often forgotten area of transparency lies in instances
where the government, acting on behalf of the public, requires pri114

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Open Government, 14 GOV’T INFO. Q. 397, 397–406 (1997).
See, e.g., Frederick Shauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, U. ILL. L. REV. 1339,
1343–50 (2011).
116
Sandara F. Chance, Access to Public Documents and Meetings, in COMMUNICATIONS
AND THE LAW 373–74 (W. Wat Hopkins ed., 2012).
117
Adam Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative State, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 396
(2013).
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Transparency and Open Government, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685–86 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1777.pdf.
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Patrice McDermott, Building Open Government, 27 GOV’T INFO. Q. 401, 401–13
(2010).
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vate actors to disclose information.120 Within the regulation of private actors, transparency plays an important role in incentivizing
good behavior, promoting informed decision-making from consumers, and preventing corruption. For industry stakeholders, this
method of regulation is much less cumbersome than laws mandating specific conduct and behavior and may be used to help promote
market safeguards. Within various sectors of the economy, disclosure of information by private companies to the public is nothing
new and provides an important vehicle for accountability. Regulatory transparency and disclosure laws exist, for instance, for publicly traded companies; financial, banking, trading, and lending institutions; cyber breaches; higher education institutions receiving
public grants; and food and pharmaceutical industries.121 Because
of the increased importance of fixed and wireless broadband connectivity, it is within this vein that the FCC’s network neutrality
disclosure rules were created, in effect, to not only understand the
network management practices of broadband Internet access providers but also foster further growth in the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability.
Several scholars have addressed the role of transparency as an
important policy remedy to address network neutrality. Before the
recent policy developments in the US, Europe approached network
neutrality primarily from a transparency perspective under the new
EU Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications, whereby regulators rely upon making consumers more aware of the network
management practices of their network operators and place emphasis on quality of service measures.122 Using experimental economic
research, Sluijs, Schuett, and Henze suggest information disclosed
regarding broadband quality leads to a higher total surplus and consumer surplus.123

120

Such a process has been referred to as “audited self-regulation.” See Douglas C.
Mitchell, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 176 (1995).
121
See generally David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J.
OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155 (2006).
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See Jasper P. Sluijs et al., Transparency Regulation in Broadband Markets: Lessons from
Experimental Research, 35 TELECOMM. POL’Y 592, 592–94 (2011).
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Id. at 600.
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In arguing that the FCC has authority to enforce disclosure requirements, Amanda Leese suggests the network neutrality disclosure rules impact market competition and user behavior broadly,
and are distinct from the content-based network management practices of non-discrimination and no-blocking yet nevertheless remain vital for such provisions to function cohesively.124 Larry
Downes suggests the transparency rule’s standard rooted in information “sufficient” for consumers to make “informed choices”
may be too broad and result in information overload for most consumers. As the FCC suggests, to help abate these concerns, network neutrality disclosure policy may have to rely upon third parties to help monitor and evaluate broadband network management
practices.125
In a similar vein, Elizabeth Austin Bonner suggests that the
rules may provide consumers too much information without the
literacy to understand such technical information.126 As an alternative, the FCC may pursue simplified disclosures to consumers and
a more intricate and technically detailed set of network management practices to over-the-top content and service providers.127
Nevertheless, Bonner praises the disclosure efforts for their ability
to foster greater broadband services competition and performance,
increase citizen participation in policymaking, and shift costs away
from regulators to industry while requiring less precision than other measures.128
Adam Candeub and John McCartney are critical of the network
neutrality disclosure provisions’ assumptions regarding consumers.129 Because most consumers do not have a competitive choice
among broadband providers, any information disclosed will not be
124

Amanda Leese, Net Transparency: Post-Comcast FCC Authority to Enforce Disclosure
Requirements Critical to ‘Preserving the Internet’, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 98
(2013).
125
See Larry Downes, Unscrambling the FCC’s Net Neutrality Order: Preserving the Open
Internet But Which One?, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 83, 90 (2011).
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See Elizabeth Austin Bonner, Network Neutrality Disclosures: More and Less
Information, 8 I/S: J. OF L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 173, 179 (2012).
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See id. at 197–202.
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Id. at 182.
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See Adam Candeub & Daniel John McCartney, Network Transparency: Seeing the
Neutral Network, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 229–30 (2010).
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very useful to foster greater market competition or performance.130
In addition, most typical consumers will lack the technical acumen
to understand traffic management practices.131 Furthermore, there
are concerns over what content should be disclosed to help consumers. “Effective disclosure must actually aid consumers (or
market intermediaries) in assessing the value of the product,”132
but finding the quality or value of Internet access presents several
questions regarding adjacent networks, traffic policies of their
peers, and how different types of traffic are handled by network
management practices. Alternatively, Candeub and McCartney
propose that network transparency should focus on internal traffic
management practices to assess quality of service as well external
interconnection relationships with ISPs.133 Furthermore, they recommend that disclosures be written to an “Internet Vanguard”
audience that possesses the technical competency to understand
network management practices.134
There are also some policy advocates who are wary of network
neutrality rules in general because of the costs they extract to
broadband providers, including the transparency provisions. Congresswoman Marsha Blackburn (R–TN) and FCC Commissioner
Michael O’Rielly believe a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the
transparency requirements is necessary to help measure consumer
benefit, quantify costs, and abate concerns over regulatory overreach.135
One central purpose behind the Open Internet Rules is to promote competition “throughout the Internet ecosystem.”136 The
Commission suggests five reasons why disclosure of network management practices supports competition “as well as innovation,
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(July 10, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/382367/closer-look-net-neutral
ity-marsha-blackburn-michael-orielly.
136
Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,951 n.252 (2010).
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investment, end-user choice and broadband adoption.”137 First,
consumers are able to “make informed choices regarding the purchase and use of broadband service.”138 Second, disclosure will
build more confidence among broadband users and should lead to
greater broadband adoption and investment.139 Third, the transparency rules provide startups and edge providers information that
contributes to “innovation, investment and competition.”140
Fourth, disclosure helps put pressure on broadband providers to
abide by their disclosed practices while allowing the Internet community to monitor their conduct.141 Lastly, disclosure provides the
necessary tools and information to the FCC to review, report, and
enforce the transparency rules.142
To some extent, disclosure practices are not entirely new to the
FCC and the telecommunications industry. The FCC, for instance,
has subjected common carriers to extensive filing requirements to
disclose information143 and requires MVPDs, Internet access providers, and wireless carriers to report annual subscription and revenue data. Broadcast television licensees are also required to disclose on a quarterly basis how they fulfill their requirements to air
programming designed to meet children’s “educational and informational needs.”144 As a condition of their license, all broadcast
stations are also required to maintain and make available a public
inspection file upon request that serves to disclose to the public
how they fulfill their public interest obligations.145 Likewise, as a
result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the v-chip, the
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guides/common-carrier-filing-requirements-information-firms-providing-telecommunica
tions-services.
144
FCC, CHILDREN’S EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION (Feb. 20, 2014), http://transit
ion.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/childtv.pdf.
145
See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (2013).
138

2015]

NEUTRALITY 2.0

663

broadcast industry discloses its own television ratings system to
consumers.146
Cass Sunstein argues that so-called “information disclosure”
to consumers is a more efficient and less expensive response to address market failure than command-and-control regulation that dictates specific conduct by firms.147 In addition, increasing information to consumers—as opposed to direct forms of behavioral
regulation—tends to minimize any First Amendment concerns that
may be raised by telecommunications firms148 and provides greater
regulatory flexibility.149 Furthermore, as a form of regulation, information disclosure helps foster deliberative democracy, specifically the ability for citizens to serve as watchdog to monitor private
as well as public action and potentially call for change.150 As
Sunstein suggests, “information disclosure works best when market pressures, or political pressures, are likely to result in significant costs for those whose performance is poor.”151
Gerald Faulhaber contends transparency is important in the
broadband context so consumers may understand their relationship
with ISPs.152 Even without any network neutrality provisions,
broadband ISPs should publicly disclose their offerings and be
transparent with consumers because “markets can only work well
if both producers and consumers are well-informed about the terms
and conditions of transactions,”153 or they run the risk of market
failure under information asymmetry. Faulhaber suggests four
principles of transparency that may be used for policy analysis:
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See FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING: HOW TO GET THE MOST SERVICE FROM
YOUR LOCAL STATION (July 2008), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA08-940A2.pdf.
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“Disclose all information (and only such
information) that a reasonable customer needs
to make an informed purchase decision”154
 “[E]asy access to the disclosed information”155
 “Clarity
and
simplicity
of
disclosed
156
information”
 “Verifiability of disclosed information”157
An additional element of enforcement may be added to the
above aspects of disclosure.158 The implementation of these principles is difficult in the broadband ISP industry where there are many
variables that affect measures like speed, visibility, and ease of access to terms of service agreements. This stems in part from the
challenge of keeping network management practices simple, broadband ISPs’ business relationships with other ISPs, application and
network providers and security concerns over malware.159
Tracing the rise of disclosure rules within the network neutrality debate, Carp, Kulkarni, and Schmidt are skeptical of transparency efforts as a tool for public policy.160 They suggest transparency
and disclosure are frequently used interchangeably by the FCC in
its Open Internet Rules, whereby “disclosure is a tool to produce
transparency, transparency simply requires disclosure. That pairing is simplistic and inadequate. The disclosure of information does
not ensure that the provision of broadband services is transparent.”161
In fact, they warn against the disturbing trend of
“nondisclosing disclosures” whereby terms or notices appear to be
perfectly legal but are manipulated to obscure meaning.162 To guard
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against these outcomes, they suggest the Commission closely monitor ISPs’ terms of service agreements.163
In addition, Fung, Graham, and Weil’s model for transparency
is suggested because it focuses on an “action cycle” between the
disclosures (firms) and users as primary actors.164 Under this model, the mere pressure of disclosing information as well as users
monitoring and exercising consumer choices likely enhances disclosing firms’ practices.165 Despite these incentives, enforcement is
nevertheless an important part of transparency policy.166
Today, disclosure is common practice through terms of service
agreements when a subscriber signs up for telephone, cable, or
wireless services.167 These terms of service or terms of use agreements are by their very nature an attempted exercise in transparency by private companies who are providing contractual language
that details their conduct, and through the consent process when
someone agrees to the terms, they typically alleviate themselves
from any specific liability or regulatory enforcement. But what is
new is the nature by which terms of service agreements play an increasingly important role in just about every facet of online life and,
in the case of broadband Internet access service, may now fall in
the hands of regulatory agencies like the FCC to monitor. Furthermore, transparency takes on an additional layer when a regulatory agency like the FCC requests a specific range of information
be disclosed to consumers and will fine providers who fail to comply with the rules.
A. Transparency Provisions of the Open Internet Rules
Transparency rules are the only safeguards that have thus survived judicial review far by which the public and the FCC may ensure that broadband Internet access providers are adequately abiding by their self-disclosed network management practices. While
163
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the 2015 Open Internet Order enhanced the transparency requirements,168 the 2010 Open Internet Rules remain in full force with
only slight modifications.169 For both fixed and mobile broadband
providers, complying with the transparency rules “does not require
public disclosure of competitively sensitive information or information that would compromise network security or undermine the
efficacy of reasonable network management practices.”170 Outside
of these exceptions, the rules themselves provide a wide degree of
latitude concerning the extent of information broadband providers
have to disclose through their terms of service agreements and other policies.
Through the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) Transparency Compliance Public Notice, the FCC detailed five areas related
to meeting the transparency rules as set forth in the 2010 Open Internet Rules: (1) point-of-sale disclosures; (2) service descriptions;
(3) security; (4) the tailoring of disclosures to content, applications,
service, and device providers; and (5) extent of required disclosures.171 Each of these areas is detailed below.
1. Point-of-Sale Disclosures
The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau and OGC issued basic suggestions on how consumers must be afforded the opportunity to see
terms of service agreements at the “point-of-sale” that include
network management practices, performance characteristics, and
commercial terms.172 To meet this portion of the disclosure rules,
broadband providers must at the very least either prominently display or provide links to disclosures on a website easily accessible to
168

2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 8, ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 161 (“All of the pieces of information described in paragraphs 56 and 98 of the
Open Internet Order have been required as part of current transparency rule, and we will
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members of the public, including both new and existing end users
and edge providers.173 This does not mean that such materials have
to be in hard copy or require training of sales employees to be familiar with all of the terms and conditions.174 Broadband providers
may comply with this requirement by directing new customers to
view disclosures on the web, either orally or in writing, and by
keeping the disclosures regularly updated.175 Nevertheless, brick
and mortar outlets are encouraged to provide equipment to view
such disclosures to customers.176
2. Service Descriptions
With regard to service descriptions, broadband providers must
disclose accurate information on network performance for each
type of service offered.177 For fixed broadband, the OGC suggests
that a large part of this requirement may be accomplished by disclosing the results of the broadband performance measurement
project (“BPMP”) that records key performance metrics, including baseline connection speed as well as latency.178 Although in its
infancy stages, the BPMP will likely play a major role in attaining
an accurate measurement of network performance characteristics,
as it covers roughly eighty-six percent of all fixed connections.179
For fixed broadband providers participating in the BPMP, disclosing results from the project will be enough to satisfy the requirement.180 For instance, providers may elect to report mean upload
and download speeds during the busy periods of 7:00–11:00 P.M.
Smaller providers not participating in the BPMP may follow the
project’s methodology and report results or disclose accurate performance information from internal testing or consumer speed test
data.181
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In terms of reporting mobile network performance measures,
the OGC describes how the FCC will provide further guidance
once it has an opportunity to review how to best capture and measure data.182 Subsequent to the OGC guidelines, the FCC has recently released an app that consumers may download onto their
broadband mobile device to measure speed and latency.183 Until
that is formally recommended as a measurement and disclosure
tool, however, mobile broadband providers that attain reliable information may disclose these results, whether captured by themselves or a third party.184 Disclosure in the mobile context may
mean upload and download speeds or round-trip latency.185 Smaller
providers without these performance measures may report a typical speed range (“TSR”) for each service tier offered accompanied
by a statement that these are the best available approximations.186
To help ensure accuracy, both mobile and fixed broadband providers are encouraged to disclose the source and methodology behind their network performance metrics.187 In addition, broadband
providers are requested to re-evaluate network performance when
they have knowledge or have reason to believe there is a material
difference between disclosed and actual network performance.188
3. Tailoring of Required Disclosures
The OGC suggests the transparency provisions of the current
Open Internet Rules in effect may be met through a single disclosure.189 This disclosure may be used to help accurately inform not
only consumers but content, application, service, and device providers, including so-called edge providers.190 Mobile providers are
182
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also obligated to provide disclosure of their certification and approval procedures for devices and applications.191
4. Security Measures
The OGC also suggests that providers may utilize their discretion in deciding whether to disclose particular security measures to
consumers.192 Nevertheless, effective disclosures should aim to
provide information addressing end-user or network security practices. Broadband providers must be mindful that consumers may
need to understand security practices to make informed choices for
their Internet use. Likewise, content, application, service, and device providers may also require knowledge of security practices to
aid in their development. The OGC reminds broadband providers
that security measures may in effect impact the end user’s ability to
“access the content, applications, services, and devices of his or
her choice.”193
5. Extent of Required Disclosures
Perhaps most importantly, the FCC suggested that the extent
of the transparency rules may be met by including some or all of the
following:
 Network practices (including congestion
management, application-specific behavior,
device attachment rules and security measures);
 Performance characteristics, including a general
description of system performance (speed,
latency) and effects of specialized services on
available capacity; and
 Commercial terms, including pricing, privacy
policies, and redress options.194

Internet offerings, will not need to make separate or additional disclosures for the specific
benefit of edge providers.”).
191
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192
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193
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194
See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,938–39, 17,959, at ¶¶ 56,
98 (2010).
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The above areas come directly from Paragraphs 56 and 98 of
the Open Internet order.195 The OGC clarifies that disclosure of
information contained in these paragraphs will suffice for compliance with the transparency rule.196 The Commission clearly states
that all of the items detailing the extent of the required disclosures
are not exhaustive and providers may meet the disclosure requirement in other ways.197 In providing additional flexibility, the FCC
does not expect that providers will disclose all of the suggested
items.198 Likewise, the list in and of itself does not constitute a socalled safe harbor for fulfilling the transparency rules. Upon further
examination, each of the above provisions contains several elements as highlighted below.
a) Network Practices
The area of network practices centers on how broadband providers manage their network in ways that may directly impact Internet users.199 As a result, the FCC suggests broadband providers
disclose congestion management, application-specific behavior,
device-attachment rules, and security as summarized below:
 Congestion Management: Description of
congestion management practices; types of
traffic; purposes; effects of practices on enduser experience; criteria used in practices
(including
triggers
and
frequency
of
congestion); usage limits and consequences of
exceeding them; and engineering standards.200
 Application-Specific Behavior: Whether and
why provider blocks or rate-controls specific
protocols or protocol ports; modifies protocol
fields in ways not proscribed by protocols; or

195
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inhibits or favors certain applications or classes
of applications.201
Device Attachment Rules: Any restrictions on
types of devices and approval procedures for
devices to connect to network.202
Security: Practices used to ensure end-user
security or security of network, including types
of triggering conditions for mechanisms to be
invoked.203

b) Performance Characteristics
To help end users ascertain the quality of the network, the
FCC suggests204 broadband providers may detail the following performance characteristics that elaborate on broadband Internet access service and any specialized services that may be offered:
 Service Description: General description of
service, including technology, expected and
actual access speed and latency; suitability of
service for real-time applications.205
 Impact of Specialized Services: What, if any, are
offered to end users, and whether and how any
specialized services may affect last-mile capacity
available for and the performance of broadband
Internet access service.206
c) Commercial Terms
To set a standard in many terms of use agreements, the FCC
suggests broadband providers be forthcoming about the commercial terms to help consumers make informed decisions concerning
broadband Internet access service, including the following:
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Pricing: Monthly prices; usage-based fees; fees
for early termination; fees for additional network
services.207
Privacy Policies: Whether network management
practices entail inspection of network traffic;
whether traffic information is stored, provided
to third parties, or used by the carrier for nonnetwork management purposes.208
Redress Options: Practices for resolving enduser and edge provider complaints and
questions.209

d) Mobile
The FCC suggests that all of the above transparency provisions
regarding network practices, performance characteristics, and
commercial terms also apply to mobile Internet access providers.210
Mobile providers should also consider their current disclosure obligations if they are a licensee of the upper 700 MHz block spectrum allocation.211 In addition, the FCC suggests mobile providers
disclose the process for third-party device and application certification,212 as well as information regarding denials to access the network or failures to approve particular devices or applications.213
6. Enforcement
The Commission may exercise enforcement if broadband providers fail to comply with the transparency rules through adjudication on a case-by-case basis, including the issuance of monetary
penalties.214 Parties who are affected by transparency rule violations, including end users and edge providers, are encouraged to
207
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file informal complaints on the Commission’s website free of filing
fees under Section 1.41 of FCC rules.215 The Enforcement Bureau
will monitor informal complaints to locate common themes and
potentially issue investigations or enforcement actions.216 In addition, any person may also file a formal complaint that specifies how
the rules have been violated and contains supporting facts “sufficient to establish a prima facie case.”217 One example of a formal
open Internet complaint being filed comes from the non-profit Public Knowledge, which claims that wireless broadband Internet access providers AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon have failed
to adequately disclose network practices concerning throttling.218
Although providers are allowed much discretion on what may
be included to comply, whatever is disclosed should be accurate.
As stated in a 2014 enforcement advisory, the FCC believes that
“accuracy is the bedrock of the Transparency Rule”219 to allow
consumers to be informed about the purchase of their broadband
Internet access service and give edge providers the necessary information to further innovate and compete. Accuracy must take
place “wherever statements regarding network management practices, performance, and commercial terms appear—in mailings, the
sides of buses, on website banner ads, or in retail stores.”220 If a
provider makes a false or misleading claim of its service performance, it would “not defend itself against a Transparency Rule
violation by pointing to an ‘accurate’ official disclosure in some
other public place.”221

215

Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,986, ¶ 153 (2010). The FCC’s
complaint website is available at http://esupport.fcc.gov/complaints.htm.
216
Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,986, ¶ 153 (2010).
217
Id.
218
See Grant Gross, Public Knowledge Readies Complaint on Mobile Traffic Throttling, PC
WORLD (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2462320/public-knowledgereadies-complaint-on-mobile-traffic-throttling.html; Brynne Henn, Public Knowledge
Initiates Open Internet Complaints Against AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/pressrelease/public-knowledge-initiates-open-internet-complaint-against-att-sprint-and-v.
219
Open Internet Transparency Rule: Broadband Providers Must Disclose Accurate
Information to Protect Consumers, 29 FCC Rcd. 8,606 (2014).
220
Id.
221
Id.

674

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:639

III. COMPLIANCE WITH TRANSPARENCY &
OPEN INTERNET RULES
To aid in describing how the FCC’s transparency provisions
apply to broadband providers, this Part reviews the various components of Verizon’s terms-of-service agreements for both fixed and
mobile broadband. The legal analysis presented below mirrors the
various categories and descriptors the FCC has suggested in the
Open Internet Rules as discussed above in Part II. Because they
require different facilities and transactions, the review of Verizon’s
terms of service as a fixed and wireless broadband Internet access
provider are handled separately below.
A. Verizon’s Fixed Broadband Disclosure
1. Network Practices
Verizon’s Network Management Guide, available on its website, provides information for consumers regarding the company’s
wired broadband network practices.222 The Guide is structured according to the Open Internet Rules’ criteria and covers congestion
management, application-specific behavior, device-attachment
rules, security, and the effect of specialized services.223
For congestion management, Verizon notes that it “does not
affirmatively manage congestion on the network through mechanisms such as real-time throttling, blocking, or dropping of specific
end user traffic.”224 Moreover, Verizon does not impose data usage
limits.225 With regard to application-specific behavior, Verizon
does not “inhibit or favor certain applications or classes of applications of traffic on [its] Internet access service,”226 except when performing security-related functions such as blocking non-Verizon
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domain email from being sent from Port 25227 and scanning Verizon
email messages for spam.228
Verizon’s device-attachment rules permit users to “attach any
lawful device to the network as long as it does not harm the network or the provision of Internet access service”229 and provide
information regarding fee-based technical support to help users
install third-party devices.230 The security section identifies as triggers for account suspension any violations of its acceptable use policy or terms of service in addition to any activity that “threatens to
undermine the integrity or normal operation of our networks or
services, or the security of our networks or our customers.”231
2. Performance Characteristics
In addition to network practices, the Guide also provides some
performance characteristic information and links to others.232 Verizon provides a general overview of its broadband technology, informing users that factors such as telephone line wiring might affect performance.233 In its discussion of specialized services, the
Guide warns that Verizon FiOS network speeds “may be reduced
temporarily during times of significant utilization of FiOS TV video on demand service in a particular area or due to other unusual
events such as a network outage or failure”234 or if a user is watching multiple FiOS TV streams simultaneously.235 Verizon also includes a link to speed test results from the FCC’s BPMP report for
its FiOS236 and DSL237 services.
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3. Commercial Terms
Verizon’s website offers wired and wireless Internet pricing information as called for by the Open Internet Rules.238 Both wired
and wireless services are subject to Verizon’s privacy policy, which
includes information regarding the company’s extensive data collection and aggregated data sharing schemes.239
B. Verizon’s Mobile Broadband Disclosure
Verizon addresses its network practices, performance characteristics, and commercial terms for wireless broadband services on
its website in a Q&A scheme that deviates from its aforementioned
wired broadband policies.240
1. Network Practices
Unlike its fixed broadband terms of service that address network practices, Verizon does not follow the FCC’s suggested format to include application-specific behavior, device-attachment
rules, and security.241 In addressing congestion management, Verizon warns that for wireless customers who fall “within the top 5%
of Verizon Wireless data users,”242 the company “may reduce the
customer’s data throughput speeds when the customer is connected to a cell site experiencing high demand for the remainder of the
customer’s then current and immediately following billing cycle.”243 The company also engages in content-neutral network op-
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timization to compress and deliver data efficiently to customers’
mobile devices.244
While Verizon does not discriminate against lawful Internet
traffic, it does block “malicious or other adverse, networkimpacting traffic”245 and specific IP addresses known to be responsible for spam or cyber threats based on Verizon’s and third-party
analysis.246
2. Performance Characteristics
Verizon explains its performance by detailing the bandwidth
speed range within which each of its wireless networks operates
and notes potential limiting factors.247 Verizon also provides information about its coverage and testing methodology,248 but does not
include any mention of the FCC’s suggested inclusion of specialized services.
3. Commercial Terms
Verizon offers the same type of information regarding its wireless pricing as it does for its wired customers.249
4. Additional Mobile Information
Verizon only permits its customers to use Verizon-certified devices on its network, although the company is agnostic as to where
the device is purchased.250 As suggested in the Open Internet
Rules, Verizon’s website showcases the means by which thirdparty devices and applications can be certified for Verizon’s networks.251 The “Open Development Device Certification Process”
244
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manual describes the standards and processes required for thirdparty device certification,252 and the “4G LTE ‘Open Access’
Application Guidelines” provide information on application requirements.253 However, Verizon’s website does not provide specific information regarding its denial of network access to particular
devices or services.
C. Verizon’s Compliance with Transparency Rules
With the exception of some missing information for mobile,
Verizon is readily disclosing its network practices, performance
characteristics, and commercial terms that have been suggested by
the FCC, and therefore appears to be complying with the transparency provisions of the Open Internet Rules.254 It should also be
noted that Verizon is attempting to use a single disclosure to meet
the various needs of end users, edge providers, and the larger Internet community to comply with the existing rules.255 In a similar
vein, outside of the speed and latency measures, there is no current
measuring stick other than informal and formal complaints to verify
the accuracy of the disclosed information.
Although not germane to Verizon specifically, the FCC recently raised a number of complaints regarding end-user transparency
in its recent Open Internet NPRM.256 This list includes questions
about whether the information supplied by broadband providers is
in fact accurate, claims that consumers believe their speed falls
short of advertised speeds, claims that consumers were charged in
excess of advertised rates including fees and charges beyond basic
rates, slow or congested service complaints, not understanding ex-
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cessive use and termination policies, and confusion on how data
caps are calculated.257
IV. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
TRANSPARENCY AS NETWORK NEUTRALITY 2.0
Thus far, the only successful, legally standing policy for network neutrality in the U.S. resides in the transparency rules. Regardless of whether the 2015 Open Internet Order’s reclassification
of broadband Internet access service and prohibitions against blocking, paid prioritization and throttling survive judicial review,258 the
disclosure provisions of the Open Internet Rules are likely to sustain and play a vital role moving forward in how we govern and stay
informed with respect to the first and last mile of broadband connectivity. The network neutrality transparency rules provide a potential safeguard to the fact that most consumers do not have a
great array of choices when it comes to their broadband ISP, especially in the fixed context. To the extent the FCC forces the hand
of broadband providers to disclose how they manage their network,
the transparency rules should be applauded as a regulatory strategy
that aims to help inform consumers, edge providers, and the broader Internet community.
But as this Article demonstrates, the transparency rules do not
solve everything; rather, they simply provide us with what otherwise may not have been disclosed information in standard, preOpen Internet Rules terms of use or service agreements. Even the
mere suggestions of what to include in the agreements leave the
broadband providers with a great deal of latitude because the
257
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FCC’s list is admittedly not exhaustive, nor must everything on the
list be disclosed.
Terms of use agreements and their disclosure play an increasingly important role for social media sites, broadband providers,
and mobile applications, as they typically confer a bundle of rights
and legal provisions to providers and users. These arrangements
generally take the form of non-negotiated contracts of adhesion as
so-called “click-wrap” agreements, which define providers’ relationships with their users.259 In practice, these terms of use agreements leave no room for negotiation and are more or less a take-itor-leave-it offering to the consumer by the broadband Internet access provider. Depending on locality and whether it is fixed or mobile connectivity, a consumer may have to merely accept these provisions, including network management practices that are disclosed
under the Open Internet Rules because there is simply no choice
among broadband providers in a specific geographic area.
The dependency on terms of service as a form of primary disclosure to comply with the transparency rules relies on an important assumption and critique of so-called click-wrap agreements. Most individuals rarely read the varied terms of service that
they consent to prior to obtaining service. Furthermore, often individuals lack the literacy in understanding all of the legal and technical jargon of conditions that specify rights and liability. Lastly,
terms of use are non-negotiable from the standpoint of the provider
and do not provide much in the way of participation from consumers other than to refuse consent or litigate the provider for breach
of contract.
To help alleviate some of these concerns, the transparency
rules do provide a participatory mechanism to the FCC through
the informal complaint process. But more efforts should be done to
help improve outreach and consumer education in this area
through various guides with suggested topics such as understanding terms of use, navigating network management practices and
what it means for you, and factors in choosing a fixed or wireless
broadband Internet access provider. In addition, to make some of
the more fundamental consumer concerns more prominent, the
259

Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 465–66 (1996).

2015]

NEUTRALITY 2.0

681

FCC should consider adopting many of the recommendations of
the Open Internet Label Study Transparency Working Group,260
suggesting a simplified practice be made available to consumers as
an option to full disclosure or terms of use transparency. A broadband provider “nutrition label” as suggested by the New America
Foundation would mostly emphasize speed, price and usage restrictions.261 Likewise, as several scholars have commented,262 the
Commission should be mindful of providing too much technical
language to consumers and instead, as suggested by the Internet
NPRM, make sure to provide tailored disclosures to edge and overthe-top providers that provide the necessary technical elements to
allow further innovation of services.263
There are also problems associated with the Commission’s efforts in transparency concerning accuracy and self-disclosure. Outside of speed and latency that is mostly measured by the BPMP for
fixed and its new mobile apps for wireless, the FCC relies upon
broadband providers’ self-reporting of accurate information to
comply with the disclosure rules. There is no accountability unless
there are either informal or formal complaints filed.264 Nor is it
clear what the definition of “accurate” specifically entails and
whether it may truly extend, as the FCC’s advisory suggested, legally to a false (or not completely accurate) claim made in an advertisement about a broadband feature.265 Transparency works best
when disclosure of information provided to the public is accurate as
well as easily understood, monitored, and enforced.266
Lastly, the transparency rules do foster the sharing of information that may lead to greater advanced telecommunications capability and promote local competition in Section 706, especially if
260

TRANSPARENCY WORKING GROUP OF THE OPEN INTERNET ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
OPEN INTERNET LABEL STUDY (Aug. 20, 2013), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/
cgb/oiac/Transparency-Label-Study.pdf.
261
Benjamin Lennett et al., Broadband Truth-in-Labeling, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/broadband_truth_in_
labeling.
262
See Bonner, supra note 126; Candeub & McCartney, supra note 129.
263
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5,561, 5,586, ¶ 68 (2014).
264
Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,986, ¶ 153 (2010). The FCC’s
complaint website is available at http://esupport.fcc.gov/complaints.htm.
265
FCC Enforcement Advisory, supra note 214, at 8,606, 8,607.
266
See supra text accompanying notes 126–30.

682

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:639

disclosure addresses end users, edge providers, and the larger Internet community. The clear disclosure of network management
practices and quality of service measures in broadband Internet access providers’ terms of use agreements provides important information to consumers to make informed choices about their selection of their high-speed provider and expectations in terms of what
they may experience as a subscriber. Furthermore, disclosure also
allows edge providers to better understand how their particular data traffic may be managed and prioritized by broadband providers
and whether they need to adapt their own protocols to provide a
more seamless experience for their users. This disclosure to edge
providers will further foster greater innovation and ensure availability of a competitive array of advanced telecommunications capability services that are available to consumers vis-à-vis their local
broadband Internet access provider.
While disclosure and transparency provisions should be essential components of the FCC’s approach to network neutrality going
forward, questions nevertheless remain about the confounding nature of terms of use and service agreements throughout various aspects of the Internet. Although it may not fall under the direct auspices of Section 706, greater consideration of how privacy, security, and copyright provisions exist within the broadband providers’
terms of use agreements is warranted, as many end users rely on
this connection as their vital link to the rest of the Internet ecosystem. This is especially the case if the prohibitions against blocking,
paid prioritization and throttling eventually are not mandated. Regardless, transparency is important in an environment in which
terms of use and service agreements continue to take on additional
importance because of the ever-increasing growth in usergenerated content, smartphone applications, and social media engagement and the corresponding legal and ethical concerns regarding personal privacy, anonymity, data use, and copyright. Ultimately, many Americans are concerned about Internet blocking and discrimination even if they do not agree on how to regulate it.267 This
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will make transparency and access to relevant information an increasingly important factor to further the development of advanced
telecommunications capability in the years to come, including the
use of broadband services and applications.

